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Evolution toward a Nash equilibrium
Ioannis Avramopoulos
In this paper, we study the dynamic behavior of Hedge, a well-known algorithm in theoretical
machine learning and algorithmic game theory. The empirical average (arithmetic mean) of the
iterates Hedge generates is known to converge to a minimax equilibrium in zero-sum games.
We generalize that result to show convergence of the empirical average to Nash equilibrium in
symmetric bimatrix games (that is bimatrix games where the payoff matrix of each player is the
transpose of that of the other) in the sense that every limit point of the sequence of averages is
an ǫ-approximate symmetric equilibrium strategy for any desirable ǫ. Our analysis gives rise to
a symmetric equilibrium fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, implying P = PPAD.
1 Introduction
“You want forever, always or never.”
— The Pierces
Game theory is a mathematical discipline concerned with the study of algebraic, analytic, and
other objects that abstract the physical world, especially social interactions. The most important
solution concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1950], a strategy profile (combination
of strategies) in an N -player game such that no unilateral player deviations are profitable. The
Nash equilibrium is an attractive solution concept, for example, as Nash showed, an equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist in any N -person game. Over time this concept has formed a basic cornerstone
of economic theory, but its reach extends beyond economics to the natural sciences and biology.
One of the limitations of Nash equilibrium as a plausible solution concept is that we did not have
an efficient algorithm for computing one. In fact, it has been conjectured that Nash equilibrium
computation is intractable as it is complete for the complexity class PPAD [Daskalakis et al., 2009,
Chen et al., 2009]. This class, introduced by Papadimitriou [1994], contains a variety of related
problems (such as computing Brouwer fixed points) that we didn’t have efficient algorithms for.
Thus, there was a gap between game theory and the theory of computing. In this paper, we take a
step toward reconciling these disciplines using dynamical systems theory as an intermediate step.
The notion of equilibrium admits various definitions in the mathematical sciences. One such
standard definition is as a fixed point of a dynamical system. Research in dynamical systems is
hardly content with identifying the fixed points of a (continuous) flow or a (discrete) map. What
is ultimately important in this mathematical branch is to understand the evolution of system
trajectories whether near fixed points (or near, for example, limit cycles) or globally. The Nash
equilibrium can also be understood as a fixed point, for example, of the best response correspondence
of a game (and other dynamics). But dynamical systems (as, for example, studied in theory of
learning in games [Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006] or evolutionary
game theory [Weibull, 1995, Sandholm, 2010]) whose trajectories evolve toward a Nash equilibrium
(generically, without restrictive assumptions on the payoff structure) eluded us. Since dynamical
systems are algorithms, progress in this direction evidently informs algorithmic research.
There are classes of games where equilibrium computation was already known to be tractable:
Zero-sum games are equivalent to linear programming and thus minimax equilibrium computation
admits a polynomial-time algorithm. A bimatrix game is called symmetric if the payoff matrix of
each player is the transpose of that of other. Every symmetric N -person game (and, thus every
symmetric bimatrix game) admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1951]. If the payoff matrix
of the symmetric game is also symmetric, then the game is called doubly symmetric. Symmetric
equilibrium computation in doubly symmetric games admits a fully polynomial time approximation
scheme (FPTAS) [Ye, 1998]. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing a symmetric
equilibrium in a symmetric bimatrix game (that is not necessarily doubly symmetric).
Chen et al. [2009] show that finding a Nash equilibrium in a 2-person game is a PPAD-complete
problem and that an equilibrium FPTAS in these games (under either of “additive” or “multi-
plicative” notions of payoff approximation) implies P = PPAD. Avramopoulos [2018], drawing
on [Jurg et al., 1992], shows that an FPTAS for a symmetric equilibrium in symmetric bimatrix
games also implies that P=PPAD. Thus approximating an equilibrium in the class of games we
consider is conjectured to be a hard problem. In this paper, we refute that belief. Our result was
motivated by an elementary question concerning multiplicative weights dynamics.
An important result at the intersection of theoretical machine learning and game theory is that
the empirical average of the strategies generated by a well-known multiplicative weights algorithm,
namely, Hedge [Freund and Schapire, 1997, 1999], approaches the minimax strategy of a respective
zero-sum game. In doubly symmetric bimatrix games, Hedge is a multiplicative version of gradient
ascent (with an additional gradient exponentiation step). Gradient ascent is known to converge to
critical points of nonlinear optimization problems (for example, see [Bertsekas, 1999, p. 48]) and
symmetric equilibrium computation in a doubly symmetric game is a special case of a quadratic
programming. It is natural to expect that by tuning Hedge’s learning rate parameter, obtaining
convergence in doubly symmetric games falls within the realm of possibilities of this algorithm.
But every symmetric bimatrix game is the sum of a doubly symmetric game and a symmetric
zero-sum game in the sense that every (payoff) matrix C can be decomposed as follows:
C =
1
2
(C + CT ) +
1
2
(C − CT ).
Since the iterates of Hedge are expected to converge to a symmetric equilibrium in a doubly
symmetric game (which would imply that the empirical average of the iterates would converge
likewise) and the empirical average of the iterates is known to converge to such an equilibrium in
symmetric zero-sum games, is it then possible that the empirical average of iterates converges to a
symmetric equilibrium in the general class of symmetric bimatrix games? Our answer is affirmative.
1.1 Our results and techniques
We show in Theorem 1 that under a fixed learning rate parameter α every limit point of the sequence
of empirical averages is an ǫ-approximate symmetric equilibrium strategy for any desirable ǫ. We
achieve that by tuning parameter α. A corollary is that a symmetric equilibrium always exists in
symmetric bimatrix games. We may thus obtain alternative (constructive) proofs of existence of
equilibria and fixed points in a variety of related problems (such as N -person games). Our analysis
gives an equilibrium fully polynomial time approximation scheme, which implies P=PPAD.
The basis of our analysis is a formula for the equilibrium approximation error (cf. Lemma
6), which we derive directly from the equation defining Hedge. We pierce through this formula
in Lemma 7 using an inductive proof that makes use of the “multiplicative weights convexity
lemma.” (Lemma 7 was the hardest part of the analysis required to obtain equilibrium approxi-
mation bounds.) The multiplicative weights convexity lemma states that the composition of the
2
relative entropy function with Hedge is a convex function of α a result appears for the first time
in [Avramopoulos, 2016].1 Using this lemma we obtain in Lemma 7 a key recursive relationship
using logarithms that we make use of in our inductive proof. Our use of the logarithmic function is
related to a proof that the time average of the trajectory of the replicator dynamic in a symmetric
bimatrix game with an interior equilibrium converges to that equilibrium [Schuster et al., 1981] (see
also [Weibull, 1995, p. 91]). That the relative entropy function (also known as Kullback-Leibler
divergence) facilitates analyzing multiplicative weights (and its continuous approximation, namely,
the replicator dynamic) is well known (for example, see [Weibull, 1995, Freund and Schapire, 1999]).
1.2 Other related work
There is a significant amount of work on Nash equilibrium computation especially in the setting of
2-player games. We simply mention a boundary of those results. The Lemke-Howson algorithm for
computing an equilibrium in a bimatrix game is considered by many to be the state of the art in
exact equilibrium computation but it has been shown to run in exponential time in the worst case
[Savani and von Stengel, 2004]. There is a quasi-polynomial algorithm for additively approximate
Nash equilibria in bimatrix games due to Lipton et al. [2003] (based on looking for equilibria of
small support on a grid). Prior to our work, the best polynomial-time approximation algorithm for
a Nash equilibrium achieves a 0.3393 approximation [Tsaknakis and Spirakis, 2009].
1.3 Outline of the rest of the paper
Section 2 starts off with preliminaries in equilibrium computation discussing bimatrix and symmet-
ric bimatrix games, defining Hedge, and proving a key relationship used in our main results as an
implication of the multiplicative weights convexity lemma. Section 3 contains our main results on
asymptotic convergence to an equilibrium as well as on equilibrium approximation. Our main result
that P = PPAD is obtained via an equilibrium fully polynomial-time approximation scheme.
2 Equilibrium computation background and preliminary results
2.1 Symmetric bimatrix games
A 2-player (bimatrix) game in normal form is specified by a pair of n×m matrices A and B, the
former corresponding to the row player and the latter to the column player. A mixed strategy for
the row player is a probability vector P ∈ Rn and a mixed strategy for the column player is a
probability vector Q ∈ Rm. The payoff to the row player of P against Q is P ·AQ and that to the
column player is P ·BQ. Let us denote the space of probability vectors for the row player by P and
the corresponding space for the column player by Q. A Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game (A,B)
is a pair of mixed strategies P ∗ and Q∗ such that all unilateral deviations from these strategies are
not profitable, that is, for all P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q, we simultaneously have that
P ∗ ·AQ∗ ≥ P ·AQ∗ (1)
P ∗ · BQ∗ ≥ P ∗ · BQ. (2)
If B = AT , where AT is the transpose, (A,B) is called symmetric. Let (C,CT ) be a symmetric
bimatrix game. We call an equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗) symmetric if P ∗ = Q∗. If (X∗,X∗) is a symmetric
equilibrium, we call X∗ a symmetric equilibrium strategy. C denotes the symmetric game (C,CT ).
1In this manuscript, I erroneously believed to have shown P = PPAD. The error is in Lemma 10.
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2.1.1 Some further notation
We denote the space of symmetric bimatrix games by C. If the payoff entries lie in the range [0, 1],
we denote the corresponding space by Cˆ. Given C ∈ C, we denote the corresponding set of pure
strategies by K(C) = {1, . . . , n}. Pure strategies are denoted either as i or as Ei, a probability
vector whose mass is concentrated in position i. X(C) is the probability simplex (space of mixed
strategies) corresponding to C ∈ C. We denote the (relative) interior of X(C) by X˚(C) (every pure
strategy in X˚(C) has probability mass). Let X ∈ X(C). We define the support or carrier of X by
C(X) ≡ {i ∈ K(C)|X(i) > 0}.
2.1.2 Approximate equilibria
Conditions (1) and (2) simplify as follows for a symmetric equilibrium strategy X∗:
∀X ∈ X(C) : (X∗ −X) · CX∗ ≥ 0.
An ǫ-approximate symmetric equilibrium satisfies:
∀X ∈ X(C) : (X∗ −X) · CX∗ ≥ −ǫ.
We may equivalently write the previous expression as
(CX∗)max −X
∗ · CX∗ ≤ ǫ,
where
(CX∗)max = max{Y · CX
∗|Y ∈ X(C)}.
If Y + · CX∗ = (CX∗)max, then Y
+ is called a best response to X∗.
2.2 The convexity lemma of multiplicative weights and implications
Hedge [Freund and Schapire, 1997, 1999] induces the following map in our setting:
Ti(X) = X(i) ·
exp {αEi · CX}∑n
j=1X(j) exp {αEj · CX}
, i = 1, . . . , n, (3)
where C is the payoff matrix of a symmetric bimatrix game, n is the number of pure strategies,
Ei is the probability vector corresponding to pure strategy i, and X(i) is the probability mass of
pure strategy i. Parameter α is called the learning rate, which has the role of a step size in our
equilibrium computation setting. In this paper, we do not study the behavior of the iterates that
T generates per se but instead the sequence
{
X¯K
}∞
K=0
of empirical averages of the iterates that T
generates starting from an interior to the probability simplex strategy. The empirical average X¯K
at iteration K = 0, 1, 2, . . . is a simple arithmetic mean
X¯K =
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk.
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2.2.1 The multiplicative weights convexity lemma
Let us now give some preliminary results on Hedge dynamics. Part of our analysis of Hedge relies
on the relative entropy function between probability distributions (also called Kullback-Leibler
divergence). The relative entropy between the n × 1 probability vectors P > 0 (that is, for all
i = 1, . . . , n, P (i) > 0) and Q > 0 is given by
RE(P,Q)
.
=
n∑
i=1
P (i) ln
P (i)
Q(i)
.
However, this definition can be relaxed: The relative entropy between n× 1 probability vectors P
and Q such that, given P , for all Q ∈ {Q ∈ X|C(P ) ⊂ C(Q)}, is
RE(P,Q)
.
=
∑
i∈C(P )
P (i) ln
P (i)
Q(i)
.
We refer to [Weibull, 1995, p.96] from well-known properties of the relative entropy function. With
this background in mind, we state the following lemma (which we refer to as the multiplicative
weights convexity lemma) generalizing [Freund and Schapire, 1999, Lemma 2].
Lemma 1 ([Avramopoulos, 2018]). Let T be as in (3). Then
∀X ∈ X˚(C) ∀Y ∈ X(C) : RE(Y, T (X)) is a convex function of α.
The next lemma is shown in [Avramopoulos, 2018]. We repeat the proof for completeness. In
the proof, we use the following “secant inequality” for a convex function F (·) and its derivative
F ′(·):
∀ b > a : F ′(a) ≤
F (b)− F (a)
b− a
≤ F ′(b). (4)
Lemma 2. Let C ∈ Cˆ. Then, for all Y ∈ X(C) and for all X ∈ X˚(C), we have that
∀α > 0 : RE(Y, T (X)) ≤ RE(Y,X) − α(Y −X) · CX + α(exp{α} − 1).
Proof. Since, by Lemma 1, RE(Y, T (X)) − RE(Y,X) is a convex function of α, we have by the
aforementioned secant inequality that, for α > 0,
RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X) ≤ α (RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X))′ = α ·
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) (5)
where it can be readily computed that
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) =
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
− Y · CX.
Using Jensen’s inequality in the previous expression, we obtain
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) ≤
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}
exp{αX · CX}
− Y · CX. (6)
Note now that
exp{αx} ≤ 1 + (exp{α} − 1)x, x ∈ [0, 1],
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an inequality used in [Freund and Schapire, 1999, Lemma 2]. Using the latter inequality, we obtain
from (6) that
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) ≤
X · CX
exp{αX · CX}
− Y · CX + (exp{α} − 1)
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)
2
j
exp{αX · CX}
and since exp{αX · CX} ≥ 1 again by the assumption that C ∈ Cˆ, we have
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) ≤ X · CX − Y · CX + (exp{α} − 1)
n∑
j=1
X(j)(CX)2j .
Noting that
∑
X(j)(CX)2j ≤ 1 and combining with (5) yields the lemma.
As a corollary to the previous lemma, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let C ∈ Cˆ. Then, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all X ∈ X˚(C), we have that
∀α > 0 : ln(Ti(X)) ≥ ln(X(i)) + α(Ei −X) · CX − α(exp{α} − 1).
Proof. This lemma is a simple implication of Lemma 2 noting that RE(Ei,X) = − ln(X(i)).
We note that (5) can be obtained from Slater’s inequality as follows: Let Xˆ ≡ T (X). Then
Xˆ(i)
X(i)
=
exp{α(CX)i}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
.
Slater’s inequality (cf. [Dragomir, 2003]) gives
n∑
j=1
X(j) exp{α(CX)j} ≤ exp
{
α
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
}
.
Combining the previous inequalities, we obtain
Xˆ(i)
X(i)
≥ exp
{
α
(
(CX)i −
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)}
.
Taking logarithms
ln(Xˆ(i))− ln(X(i)) ≥ α
(
(CX)i −
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)
.
Multiplying both sides with Y (i) and summing over i = 1, . . . , n
RE(Y,X) −RE(Y, Xˆ) ≥ α
(
Y · CX −
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)
.
Rearranging
RE(Y, Xˆ)−RE(Y,X) ≤ α
(∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
− Y · CX
)
,
and, thus,
RE(Y, Xˆ)−RE(Y,X) ≤ α
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)).
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3 Convergence under a fixed learning rate and P=PPAD
3.1 Our asymptotic convergence result
Theorem 1. Let C ∈ Cˆ and Xk ≡ T k(X0), where X0 ∈ X˚(C) is the uniform distribution. Assume
the learning rate α > 0 is constant. Then considering the sequence of empirical averages{
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk ≡ X¯K
}∞
K=0
,
every limit point of this sequence is an n(exp{α} − 1)-approximate symmetric equilibrium strategy
of C, where n is the number of pure strategies of C.
The assumption X0 is the uniform distribution is to simplify notation. It is a simple exercise to lift
that assumption. Note that the definition of the empirical average implies the recursive relationship
X¯K+1 =
1
K + 2
XK+1 +
K + 1
K + 2
X¯K ,
which we make use of in the sequel.
Lemma 4. Suppose X0 is the uniform distribution. Then
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K ≤ −
1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=1
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
Proof. Let T (X) ≡ Xˆ. Then straight algebra gives
Xˆ(i)
Xˆ(j)
=
X(i)
X(j)
exp{α((CX)i − (CX)j)}
and taking logarithms on both sides we obtain
ln
(
Xˆ(i)
Xˆ(j)
)
= ln
(
X(i)
X(j)
)
+ α((CX)i − (CX)j).
We may write the previous equation as
ln
(
Xk+1(i)
Xk+1(j)
)
= ln
(
Xk(i)
Xk(j)
)
+ α((CXk)i − (CX
k)j)
Summing over k = 0, . . . K, we obtain
ln
(
XK+1(i)
XK+1(j)
)
= ln
(
X0(i)
X0(j)
)
+ α
K∑
k=0
((CXk)i − (CX
k)j)
and dividing by K + 1 and rearranging, we further obtain
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
XK+1(i)
XK+1(j)
)
=
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
X0(i)
X0(j)
)
+ (Ei − Ej) · CX¯
K .
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Under the assumption X0 is the uniform distribution,
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
XK+1(i)
XK+1(j)
)
= (Ei − Ej) · CX¯
K ,
which implies
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
XK+1(imax)
XK+1(j)
)
= (CX¯K)max − (CX¯
K)j
and further implies
(CX¯K)max − (CX¯
K)j ≤ −
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
.
Multiplying both sides with X¯K(j) and summing over j = 1, . . . , n, we finally obtain
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K ≤ −
1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=1
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
as claimed.
Lemma 5. Suppose X0 is the uniform distribution. Then
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K+1 · CX¯K ≤ −
1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=1
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
Proof. The proof is directly analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1,
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K ≤ −
1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=1
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
+
1
K + 1
.
Proof. Since
X¯K+1 =
1
K + 2
XK+1 +
K + 1
K + 2
X¯K
we have
X¯K+1 · CX¯K =
1
K + 2
XK+1 · CX¯K +
K + 1
K + 2
X¯K · CX¯K
and, therefore,
X¯K · CX¯K =
K + 2
K + 1
X¯K+1 · CX¯K −
1
K + 1
XK+1 · CX¯K ,
which, using the assumption C ∈ Cˆ so that XK+1 · CX¯K ≤ 1, implies
X¯K · CX¯K ≥
K + 2
K + 1
X¯K+1 · CX¯K −
1
K + 1
≥ X¯K+1 · CX¯K −
1
K + 1
,
which, combined with Lemma 5, implies the lemma.
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Lemma 7. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the sequence {Xk(j)} of probability masses
corresponding to pure strategy j ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies the following relation
−
1
α(K + 1)
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK(j)
)
≤−
1
α(K + 1)
(
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+ (exp{α} − 1) + ρK ,
where ρ = 1/2.
Proof. Our proof is by induction. The basis of the induction (K = 0) is straightforward. Suppose
now the relation is true for iteration K > 0. We then have for the next iteration
−
1
α(K + 2)
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
=
= −
1
α(K + 2)
(
1
K + 2
XK+1(j) +
K + 1
K + 2
X¯K(j)
)
ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
=
Using straight algebra we obtain
= −
1
α(K + 2)
1
K + 2
XK+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
−
1
α(K + 2)
K + 1
K + 2
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
=
= −
1
α(K + 2)
1
K + 2
XK+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
−
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
·
1
α(K + 1)
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
(7)
We may now make use of the relation
ln(Xk+1(j)) ≥ ln(Xk(j)) + α((CXk)j −X
k · CXk)− α(exp{α} − 1)
which is obtained from Lemma 3. Since (CXk)j −X
k ·CXk ≥ −1 by the assumption C ∈ Cˆ, using
straight algebra we obtain
ln(Xk+1(j)) ≥ ln(Xk(j)) − α exp{α}
Combining the previous inequality with (7), we obtain
≤−
1
α(K + 2)
1
K + 2
XK+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
−
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
·
1
α(K + 1)
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK(j)
)
+
+
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
1
α(K + 1)
α exp{α}X¯K (j)
Using the induction hypothesis we further obtain
≤−
1
α(K + 2)
1
K + 2
XK+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
−
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
1
α(K + 1)
(
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+
+
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
1
α(K + 1)
α exp{α}X¯K(j) +
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
(exp{α} − 1 + ρK)
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which implies (since 0 < X¯K(j) < 1)
≤−
1
α(K + 2)
1
K + 2
XK+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
−
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
1
α(K + 1)
(
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+
+
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
1
K + 1
exp{α} +
(K + 1)2
(K + 2)2
(exp{α} − 1 + ρK)
which further implies
≤−
1
α(K + 2)
1
K + 2
XK+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
−
1
α(K + 2)
(
1
K + 2
K∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+
+
K + 1
K + 2
exp{α} −
(
K + 1
K + 2
)2
(1− ρK)
and since
K + 1
K + 2
≥ 1− ρ,K = 0, 1, . . .
we obtain
≤−
1
α(K + 2)
1
K + 2
XK+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
−
1
α(K + 2)
(
1
K + 2
K∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+
+
K + 1
K + 2
(exp{α} − 1− ρ− ρK + ρK+1)
which finally implies
≤ −
1
α(K + 2)
(
1
K + 2
K+1∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+ (exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1
completing the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 8. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the sequence of empirical averages{
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk ≡ X¯K
}∞
K=0
,
satisfies the following relation
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K ≤
n exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+
1
K + 1
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
n(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
nρK .
(8)
Proof. Lemma 6 implies that
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K ≤ −
1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=1
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
+
1
K + 1
. (9)
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Lemma 7 further implies that
−
1
α(K + 2)
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
≤ −
1
α(K + 2)
(
1
K + 2
K+1∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+ (exp{α} − 1) + ρK .
Using elementary calculus we obtain −x ln(x) ≤ exp{−1}, x ∈ [0, 1] and, therefore,
−
1
α(K + 2)
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
≤
exp{−1}
α(K + 2)
+ (exp{α} − 1) + ρK .
Thus,
−
1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=1
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
≤
n exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
n(exp{α} − 1) + n
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ρK
and combining with (9) we obtain
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K ≤
n exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+
1
K + 1
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
n(exp{α} − 1) + n
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ρK
as claimed.
Proof of Theorem 1. (8) implies that
lim
K→∞
{
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K
}
= n(exp{α} − 1).
Therefore, if X¯ is any limit point of {X¯K}, then
(CX¯)max − X¯ · CX¯ ≤ n(exp{α} − 1),
implying it is an n(exp{α} − 1)-approximate equilibrium strategy and the theorem follows.
3.2 A fully polynomial-time approximation scheme
Deriving an equilibrium fully polynomial-time approximation scheme from relation (8) is straight-
forward as shown next. First we need a lemma:
Lemma 9. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, for all θ > 0, in
K =
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + α
αθ
⌋
(10)
iterations, we have that
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K ≤
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
n(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
nρK + θ.
Proof. Let us repeat (8) for convenience:
(CX¯K)max − X¯
K · CX¯K ≤
n exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+
1
K + 1
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
n(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
nρK .
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Letting
θ =
n exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+
1
K + 1
implies that K should be the first integer such that
K + 1 ≥
n exp{−1}
αθ
+
1
θ
=
n exp{−1} + 1 + α
αθ
.
Since ⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + α
αθ
⌋
+ 1 ≥
n exp{−1} + 1 + α
αθ
the lemma follows.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, to attain an equilibrium approximation error
that is at most ǫ, we need at most
K =
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + ln (1 + ǫ′/(3n))
(ǫ′/3) ln (1 + ǫ′/(3n))
⌋
iterations, for some ǫ′ < ǫ, which can be readily computed a priori.
Proof. The number of iterations in the statement of the theorem is obtained by letting
α = ln
(
1 +
ǫ′
3n
)
θ =
ǫ′
3
in (10). Since the first integer K ′ such that
nρK
′
≤
ǫ′
3
is
K ′ =
⌈
ln
(
ǫ′
3n
)
/ ln(ρ)
⌉
which is smaller than K, these values imply an equilibrium approximation error of at most(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ǫ′
3
+
ǫ′
3
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ǫ′
3
.
We are looking for ǫ′ such that(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ǫ′
3
+
ǫ′
3
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ǫ′
3
≤ ǫ.
To that end, we choose a lower bound Kˆ on the number of iterations, for example,
Kˆ =
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + ln (1 + ǫ/(3n))
(ǫ/3) ln (1 + ǫ/(3n))
⌋
12
and we solve (
Kˆ + 2
Kˆ + 1
)
ǫ′
3
+
ǫ′
3
+
(
Kˆ + 2
Kˆ + 1
)
ǫ′
3
≤ ǫ.
for ǫ′. Since (
K + 2
K + 1
)
ǫ′
3
+
ǫ′
3
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ǫ′
3
≤
(
Kˆ + 2
Kˆ + 1
)
ǫ′
3
+
ǫ′
3
+
(
Kˆ + 2
Kˆ + 1
)
ǫ′
3
such a choice of ǫ′ automatically satisfies(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ǫ′
3
+
ǫ′
3
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
ǫ′
3
≤ ǫ
and this completes the proof.
Corollary 1. P = PPAD
Proof. [Avramopoulos, 2018, Theorem 15] shows that symmetric equilibrium approximation in fully
polynomial time in symmetric games implies that P = PPAD. Hence the corollary.
Acknowledgments
This paper has benefitted from my interaction with my YouTube account and I thank those that
are responsible for the configuration of the content in that account.
References
I. Avramopoulos. Multiplicative weights, equalizers, and P=PPAD. arXiv eprint 1609.08934
(cs.GT), 2016.
I. Avramopoulos. On incremental deployability. arXiv eprint 1805.10115 (cs.GT), 2018.
D. P. Bertsekas. Nonlinear Programming. Athena Scientific, Belmont, Mass., second edition, 1999.
N. Cesa-Bianchi and G. Lugosi. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge University Press,
New York, NY, 2006.
X. Chen, X. Deng, and S. Teng. Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria.
Journal of the ACM, 56(3), 2009.
C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg, and C. H. Papadimitriou. The complexity of computing a Nash
equilibrium. SIAM J. Comput., 39(1):195–259, 2009.
S. S. Dragomir. A survey on Cauchy-Bunyakovsky-Schwarz type discrete inequalities. Journal of
Inequalities in Pure and Applied Mathematics, 4(3), 2003.
Y. Freund and R. E. Schapire. A decision-theoretic generalization of on-line learning and an
application to boosting. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 55(1):119–139, 1997.
Y. Freund and R. E. Schapire. Adaptive game playing using multiplicative weights. Games and
Economic Behavior, 29:79–103, 1999.
13
D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press, 1998.
A. P. Jurg, M. J. M. Jansen, J. A. M. Potters, and S. H. Tijs. A symmetrization for finite two-person
games. ZOR – Methods and Models for Operations Research, 36:111–123, 1992.
R. Lipton, E. Markakis, and A. Mehta. Playing large games using simple strategies. In Proc. EC’03,
pages 36–41, 2003.
J. F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. PNAS, 36(1), Jan. 1950.
J. F. Nash. Non-cooperative games. The Annals of Mathematics, Second Series, 54(2):286–295,
Sept. 1951.
C. H. Papadimitriou. On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of
existence. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 48(3):498–532, 1994.
W. H. Sandholm. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. MIT Press, 2010.
R. Savani and B. von Stengel. Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a
bimatrix game. In Proc. 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
pages 258–267, 2004.
P. Schuster, K. Sigmund, J. Hofbauer, and R. Wolff. Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies.
Biological Cybernetics, 40:1–8, 1981.
H. Tsaknakis and P. G. Spirakis. An optimization approach for approximate Nash equilibria.
Internet Mathematics, 5(4):365–382, 2009.
J. W. Weibull. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, 1995.
Y. Ye. On the complexity of approximating a KKT point of quadratic programming. Mathematical
Programming, 80:195–211, 1998.
14
